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INTRODUCTION – WHAT BRINGS NEW THIS TREATY? 
 
The Lisbon Treaty has brought significant changes both in the institutional and the procedural 
framework of the EU, in the area of external relations and security policy. In this respect,  I would like 
to mention some of the most substantial institutional innovations in the structure of the EU: the legal 
consecration of the European Council, the establishment the Office of the President of the European 
Council, the establishment of  the Office of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy/HR FASP who is also the Vice President of European Commission, and the creation of so-called 
“EU diplomatic service” - European Service for External Action
1. 
The strengthening of the role of the European Counci l as regards the CFSP decision-making 
process, the assumption by the HR FASP of the Permanent Presidency of the Council of Foreign 
Relations, the establishment of the mutual defence clause and the solidarity clause, or defining the legal 
                                                                 
1  Treaty on European Union,  Articles 13, 15, 18 and 27    
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framework  for  permanent  structured  cooperation  on  defence  are  other  procedural  and  regulatory 
innovations which brought the Lisbon Treaty in the area of external relations and security policy. 
All these institutional and procedural innovations as well as others not mentioned here may be the 
prerequisites to consolidate the role of the European Union in the international arena, regardless of the 
current theoretical perspective  on EU's international role and place. Neo-functionalism or liberal inter-
governamentalism,  to  name  two  of  the  representative  schools  of  thought  on  European  integration 
(Rosamond,  B,  2000,  pp.  50-73,  pp.  130-156),  could  find  sufficient  arguments  in  post-Lisbon 
institutional design to support its own interpretation on the development of the European construction, 
including the area of its foreign and security affairs. 
Of course, if we look at some of the provisions of the Treaty, we find that the EU tends to adopt 
an international normative behavior, whereas its external action must be based „by the principles that 
have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and wich it seeks to advance in the wider 
world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for principles 
of  United Nations Charter and international law” 
2.  
Considering the above mentioned premises, the purpose of this paper is to highlight the possible 
consequences of these  institutional  innovations on the  management and the  implementation of the 
European Union's external action. Priority will be given to investigate the possibility of EU to become 
a  genuine  international  political  actor,  i.e.  a  strategic  competitor,  to  be  able  to  add  at  a  classic 
hypostasis of the champion of  global trade, development assistance and of  multilateralism, a  new 
aspect - the real center of power, even in soft power option, as stated most comments in the literature, 
including those belonging to the most knowledgeable researchers in the field of CFSP (de Vasconcelos 
et al., 2010, p. 3). 
 
1. EU BETWEN LEGAL PERSONALITY AND STRATEGIC IDENTITY 
 
Besides the innovations listed above, the Lisbon Treaty comes to simplify the complicated three 
pillars  arrangement  agreed  at  Maastricht.  The  legal  personality  which  has  been  a  Union,  to  the 
detriment of the Communities, is an important step towards defining a clear identity in its relation with 
other international players. And this step is not only a symbolic one but also a legal one, because even 
                                                                 
2 Treaty on European Union,  Article 21     
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the symbolic and the communication aspects have relevance on the international scene. Without doubt, 
the "treatment" language, which followed the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty which ” removed 
from Treaties the word the Community” and its derivatives, is a subtle action but not a strong enough 
argument to strengthen the effectiveness and the coherence of EU’s international relations. 
However, deconstructing the old institutional building based on three pillars and merging them 
into a single entity  - the Union -  is the real challenge of  the  next period of time,  with significant 
implications  in  the  security  and  the  foreign  relations  sector.  Successful  political  and  institutional 
merger of former three pillars could generate both internal cohesion and the necessary consistency to 
define  a  clear  institutional  identity  and  effectiveness  and  coherence  of  EU  relations  with  its 
international partners.  
It remains to examine briefly below, if institutional adjustments made by the Lisbon Treaty are 
likely to affect the effectiveness, coherence, identity and cohesion in EU external action or in the terms 
proposed by the researchers from specialized institute in the EU CFSP „autonomy, consistency and 
coherence” (de Vasconcelos et al., 2010, p. 3).  
  
2. A UNION IN SEARCH OF COHERENCE 
 
Lack  of  coherence  has  been  one  of  constant  criticisms  made  both  favorable  and  negative 
comments concerning  the  functioning of  the external relations and security policy of the  European 
Union, since its emergence in the Maastricht Treaty until the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. The 
multitude of  institutions  that considered  themselves entitled to speak and act on behalf of external 
relations - HR CFSP, the Six-months Presidency of the Council, the European Commission President, 
the Commissioner for External Relations - require a considerable effort to achieve the lowest common 
denominator both in defining the mere position papers and statements and especially the actions of the 
EU in international area.  
Reinventing, following the former position held since a decade by J. Solana, an "innovative" HR 
FASP  institution,  seems  to  be  a  simplified  institutional  solution.  The  fact  that  this  institution 
aggregated a Permanent Presidency of External Relations Council and a position on Vice-President of 
European  Commission  radically  changes  the  inter-institutional  relations  in  the  CFSP  area  and 
apparently  resolved  the dilemma of authorized voice to speak on behalf of the  European  Union  in 
International Relations. However, this solution that brings coherence inside and in EU relations with    
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other international players and that seems to solve the dilemmas of chronic incoherence Union's CFSP 
could be challenged from several directions. One of them is the foreign relations powers conferred by a 
new institution -TEU of the President of European Council. The specification of the Treaty which seeks 
to clarify the nature and limits of the powers of the President “at his level and in that capacity, ensure 
the external representation of the Union on issue concerning its common foreign and security policy, 
without prejudice to the powers of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy” 
3 may lead to differences in interpretation. It is expected, of course, that people occupying 
these offices to make their mark on how powers is exercised and interpreted. To stake a priori only the 
wisdom of those who occupy and will occupy the two functions might be insufficient to have a well 
represented and well coordinated entity in world politics.  
In  addition,  a  structural  characteristic  of  EU  external  relations  and  security  area  is  the 
preservation of the sovereign prerogatives of the Member States under the conditions defined by the 
Treaty. It maintains the provision according to which legislation is not adopted in the field of CFSP
4. 
This provision weakens CFSP. No doubt  this feature of CFSP asks HR FASP and his team a huge 
capacity of negotiation and a good command of the art of consensus building. From this perspective, 
most often, Member States prefers to retain some discretion and to accommodate their policies with the 
Union’s  positions,  because  EU  membership  is  a  real  multiplier  of  influence  and  prestige  in 
international arena. There are some Member States which never misses an opportunity to highlight the 
specificity of the EU security and foreign relations. Polichinelle's secret is that the British approach in 
this  regard  emphasizes  the  priority  given  to  foreign  policy  in  the  UK  compared  with  EU  CFSP. 
Recently, the  British Foreign Affairs Minister, William  Hague,  has  not  hesitated to emphasize this 
priority “'The EU could not or should not act as if it were a nation state with a national foreign policy”
5. 
British example is followed by other Member States, depending on specific interests and approaches. It 
seems that the post-modernity of EU which was highlighted with a rare talent few years ago by Robert 
Cooper (Cooper, 2003, p. 6), sometimes leaves some place for the Member States as modern behavior. 
 
   
                                                                 
3 Treaty on European Union, Article 15 (5) 
4 Treaty on European Union, Article 24 (1) 
5 Rettman, A., UK champions own diplomacy over EU ‘action service’, EUobserver, 5 May, 2011,      
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3. IT’S TIME FOR THE EU EFFECTIVENESS AND PRAGMATISM IN 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS? 
 
A question like the one above generates a wide range of responses. If you look at two of the 
innovations introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon – setting up an EU diplomatic service and introducing 
the legal basis for a permanent structured cooperation on defense - you might be tempted to formulate a 
positive  response.  The  launching  of  the  European  Service  for  External  Action,  after  difficult 
negotiations between the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament could bring increased 
international  representation  and  effectiveness  for  the  Union.  But  achieving  this  goal  depends  on 
achieving at  the  level of  the newly  inter-institutional agency of  the necessary synergy between the 
skills  and  abilities  of  structures  and  resources  from  the  Council,  from  the  Commission  and  from 
Member States' diplomatic services. The ESEA’s organization scheme, brought to public’s attention 
early April, indicate a very complex mechanism which requires a strong leadership in order to ensure 
its functionality. Without this leadership, the newly established institution could simply rely on the 
administration's wide network of the Union delegations in different parts of the globe. The emergence 
of  the  comprehensive  legal  framework  that  facilitates  the  cooperation  in  defense
6  could  give the 
necessary impetus for creating an indispensable tool for the EU as a real center of power. Even for the 
status of a soft power, an idea postulated by the researchers and informally agreed by the Member 
States, the Union would need a nucleus of  permanent military forces, the appropriate command and 
intelligence  capabilities  and  strategic  transport  capabilities  to  enable  the  development  of  crisis 
management missions, at least in neighboring regions. The experience gained in achieving the Headline 
Goal 2003 and the Headline Goal 2010, including the implementation of the Battle Groups concept, as 
well as carrying out military operations and civilian crisis management operations on three continents 
is a definite purchase of Union’s security and defense area. If based on this practical experience , would 
be built a  permanent structured cooperation, in conjunction with the willingness and potential defense 
policy of certain Member States, only then we  might speak about the development of the pragmatic 
dimension  of the Union, crucial for the development of power, even in its  soft version. Of course, the 
development of this pragmatic dimension requires some further reflections. First of all, the pragmatic 
potential of the Union is dependent on the political will of the Member States, especially those with 
adequate defense capabilities. Secondly, it should be noted the risk arising from such a development for 
                                                                 
6 Treaty on European Union, Article 42 (5)       
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the  Union's  internal  coherence.  Of  course,  multi-speed  Europe  has  already  been  experienced  in 
establishing  the  single  currency  or  the  Schengen  area.    Defense  seems,  however,  an  area  more 
complicated  and  baroque,  an  area  where  more  Member  States  are  reluctant  to  put  together  the 





The above reflections and evaluations on institutional innovations introduced by the Treaty of 
Lisbon and their potential consequences in the field of EU’s external action, in particular the CFSP, 
lead us to an ambivalent conclusion. On one hand, the Foreign and Security Policy of the European 
Union has emerged strengthened from an institutional perspective. The European Service of External 
Action and the HR SPF with his triple quality represents new opportunities to bring more coherence in 
the EU’s external actions. On the other hand, the absence of binding rules, of a  legislation on the 
security and the external relations dimension of EU and the inability of  the Member States to transcend 
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